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Official and Unofficial
Civil Religious Discourse
Steven R. Goldzwig
This essay discusses Roderick P. Hart's unique contribution to the
scholarly investigation ofcivil religion in America. The essay also comments
on traditional rhetorical constructions of civil religious discourse manifest
in the presidentialpublic address ofGeorge W Bu.sh. The essay concludes by
ojfen"ng evaluative commentary on three sets ofinnate tensions that complicate
rhetorical constr-uctions of civil religion: Church and state, republicanism
and liberalism, and pluralism and secularism. Keywords: Rhetoric, civil
religion, civil religious discourse, civil religion and the presidency. church,
state, republicanism, liberalism, pluralism, secularism, Robert N Bellah,
Roderick P. Hart.
[W]e Americans are the peculiar, chosen people- the Israel of
our time, we bear the ark of the liberties of the world
Herman Melville'
od Hart's (1977) The Political Pulpit remains a landmark work
n rhetorical studies. Hart's analysis of civil religion and his
haracterization of the rhetorical properties of American civic
piety still have resonance some twenty-five years later. Perhaps Hart's
greatest contribution is the careful case he presents for the unique
contribution rhetoric (and a rhetorician) can make to the discussion
and understanding of civil religion in America. In pursuing this goal,
Hart added a dimension to American, political, and religious studies
that had been largely ignored. Like some other scholars at the timeand Robert Bellah (1967) was first among them- Hart set about arguing
the importance of American civil religion as a heuristic metaphor and,
going further, isolated irs perdurable rhetorical features. In specific terms,
Hart's careful argument on Bellah's misappropriation of the term
"religion" as the larger umbrella term for the phenomenon under study
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was and remains a significant contribution to the literature on civil
religion. 2 The term "civic piecy" was effectively argued as a more felicitous
nomenclature. Moreover, Hart, unlike Bellah, was able and willing ro
distinguish between "official" and "unofficial" civil religion. However,
rhe bulk of Hart's study focused on "official" or "mainstream" civil
religious discourse. Those civil religious speakers, groups, and
organizations displaying sectarian, partisan, and overtly ideological
p roclivities were largely beyond the scope of Hart's study. 3
Hart's alrernacive to Bellah's model was a rhetorical model: "Civic
piecy, in America at least, emerges nor so much from blind momentary
passion, bur from a knowing, practiced, thoroughly pragmatic
understanding of the suasory arabesques demanded when God and
coumry kick up their heels rhetorically" (p. 45). Parr of the relationship
described here is one of unstated contract between the political and
religious establishments. Hart employs rhe contract metaphor as a
heuristic device. That contract provides rhar each parcy adopt the "guise"
of separation, rhat employmem of mainstream religion by the politician
will be mainly rhetorical, and that each parcy will refrain overtly
overstepping its bounds rhetorically (pp. 43-44). Rabid "public
theologians" are prone to do violence to rhis contract. The contract is
informed by three primary principles: "that religion can provide an
ultimate meaning system for irs adherents, rhar government is able to
exert coercive influence on the affairs of irs citizens, and rhar both
government and religion wield considerable rhetorical power" (p. 53).
fu Hart summarizes, "In shore, religion gives us faith in faith. And when
religion shares rhe motivational cosmos with government, it becomes
only a short emotional step from faith to patriotism and from God to
country-presuming, of course, char our political leaders have their
rhetorical wits about rhem" (p. 53). Thus, "the philosophical power of
religion and the coercive influence of rhe state are burrressed equally by
their abilicy to use rhetoric often and well" [emphasis added] (p. 54).
Both religion and the stare are sources of power. Yet rhey remain
unequal partners. The stare has coercive power while religion can only
revert to symbolic influence. Thus, Hart argues, the stare has existential
jurisdiction over the citizenry and various institutions while the church
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has rhetorical jurisdiction over rhe American people. The rhetorical
strategies of civic piery as gleaned from "official" sources-i.e., expedient
complexiry, nonexistential content, ritualistic presence, and prosaic
animus, help ensure that the contract survives. In Hart's view Americans
revel in talk and rhat symbolic state is rhe key to preserving rhe contract.
As Hart notes, "should some far-sighted prelate or politician fail to notice
the fine print imbedded in the civil-religious contract and .. . misperceive
its rhetorical nature, the American people will come a-marching ....
[S]o let both clergyman and congressman be warned--civic piery, not
civil religion, is the order of this and every day in these tenuously united
states of ours" (pp. 106-1 07). These insights and conclusions, among
others, represem a major contribution. Hart taught us how such discourse
functions and why it is indeed a significantly powerful form of "talk" in
the national religio-political and cultural lexicon.
Civil Religious Discourse and the Presidency
One need only consult traditional public sources to confirm
that "official" civil religious discourse as described by Hart perseveres.
Perhaps rhe most dominant public source of "official" civil religious
discourse inheres in the national consciousness through rhe auspices of
the presidency. Richard Pierard & Robert Linder (1988) maintain that,
"historically speaking, the presidency has been intimately linked to civil
religion, and this has bonded the presidency to religious Americans"
(p. 19). Whether encountered in a prophetic or priestly version, civil
religion "represents an alliance between politics and religion at the
national level, resting on a politicized ideological base: (1) there is a
God; (2) his will can be known and fulfilled through democratic
procedures; (3) America has been God's primary agent in modern history;
and (4) the nation is the chief source of identiry for Americans in both
a political and religious sense. According to this outlook, Americans are
God's chosen people, a New Israel which made the exodus to the
prom ised Land across the sea and became a 'ciry on a hill,' a light to the
nations, proclaiming the message of democracy as the salvific doctrine
that will lead the human race to freedom, prosperiry, and happiness"
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{p. 25). The President is the "pomifex max:imus" of American civil
religion (p. 25). According co esteemed church hisrorian Marcin E.
Marry, Ronald Reagan "politicized and exulted civil religion m its highest
point in American hisrory" (qtd. in Pierard & Linder, 1988, p. ix). Bur
all presidents have carried on the tradition of civil religious discourse.
In his inaugural address, George W. Bush {200la), like his
predecessors, resurrected obligatory "official" or "mainstream" civil
religious discourse. Bush identified God as the source of our national
unity and indicated that God's work must truly be our own: "Our unity,
our union, is the serious work ofleaders and citizens in every generation.
And this is my solemn pledge: I will work to build a single nation of
justice and opportunity... .I know this is in our reach because we are
guided by a power larger than ourselves who creates us in His image."
God's hand is upon this nation and guides irs efforts: "Americans are
generous and strong and decem, not because we believe in ourselves,
bur because we hold beliefs beyond ourselves. When this spirit of
citizenship is missing, no government progran1 can replace it. When
this spirit is present, no wrong can stand against it." This is reinforced
with biblical allusions: "And I can pledge our nation to a goal: When we
see that wounded traveler on the road to Jericho, we will not pass co the
other side."
God's hand in directing America and its cause is the same now
as it was when our forefathers founded this nation: "After the Declaration
of Independence was signed, Virginia statesman John Page wrote ro
Thomas Jefferson: 'We know the race is not to the swift nor the barrie
to the strong. Do you not think an angel rides in the whirlwind and
directs this srorm' .... Much time has passed since Jefferson arrived for
his inauguration. The years and changes accumulate. But the themes of
this day he would know: our nation's grand srory of courage and its
simple dream of dignity.... We are nor this story's [A]urhor, who fills
time and eternity with [H) is purpose. Yet [H]is purpose is achieved in
our dury, and our duty is fulfilled in service to one another.... The work
continues, the story goes on. And an angel still rides in the whirlwind
and directs this storm.... God bless you all, and God bless America."
Thus we have an amorphous God calling us to unity and purpose, self-
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sacrifice and mission, setting us upon a path of rebirth and renewal and
a president, in highly recognizable form of symbolic summons, coaxing
us to our better angels in the practice of republican virtues. There is
classic symbolic inducement in the words and mythic construction in
the interpretation.
George W. Bush (200 1b) also performed the priestly function
often required by American civil religion in his moving call for a
"National Day of Prayer" in his address at the National Cathedral on
September 20, 2001. Indeed, in times of national crisis and national
shock, grief, and mourning, civil religious discourse provides a rhetorical
call to recommit ourselves to national purpose and resolve: "America is
a nation full of good fortune, with so much to be grateful for. But we
are not spared from suffering. In every generation, the world has
produced enemies of human freedom. They have attacked America,
because we are freedom's home and defender. And the commitment of
our fathers is now the calling of our time." And: "On this national day
of prayer and remembrance, we ask almighty God to watch over our
nation, and grant us patience and resolve in all that is to come. We pray
that He will comfort and console those who now walk in sorrow. We
thank Him for each life we must now mourn, and the promise of a life
to come." Bush dutifully and finingly performs his priesdy function of
national assurance and national blessing by concluding: "As we have
been assured, neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor
powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth,
can separate us from God's love. May He bless the souls of the departed.
May He comfort our own. And may He always gu ide our country....
God bless America." Bush's words confirm the following claim offered
by Pierard & Linder (1987): "One must not forget that American society
contains a significant religious component and civil religion plays a key
role in establishing national unity by promoting a common religious
faith" (p. 28).
Having confirmed that civic piety as oudined by Hare and as
described by Pierard & Linder is still fully alive and healthy in America,
the question of why such discourse perseveres is open to dispute. So
too, of course, are the judgments and evaluations regarding the proper
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interpretation of this discourse. Scholarship on civil religion has
occasioned ongoing, ofren vexing disputes over the original icy, definicion,
existence, and efficacy of such a concept. Given space consrrainrs, I
have neither the hope nor the intention of doing justice to this large
body of scholarly work. In the remainder of this essay, I would like to
direct my comments ro three sets of innate tensions which inhere in
civil religion and irs narratives: {1) church and stare, {2) republicanism
and liberalism, and {3) pluralism and secularism.

Church and State
The dual obligations posed by religion and the stare place the
religiously inclined into a de facto dual citizenship. As individuals
presumed under allegiance ro rhe service of two masters, it is nor
surprising that there will be, at times, and under certain circumstances
and situations, divided loyalties and inevitable conflicts. While some
argue that church and state might work best if each acknowledges irs
own limitations and neither oversteps its proper boundaries and interests,
it is a difficult terrain to navigate in a circumspect fashion.
Let the sacred serve the secular when it seems propitious, and
the secular wiJI defer by adumbrating a "hands off" approach to religious
affairs, verbally promoting both separation of church and state and a
concomitant advocacy of religious freedom. Bur in any particular era,
this "silent agreement" sometimes seems strained; at rimes, the covenant
can even seem "broken." At such times, scholarly attention to civil
religious narratives is even more necessary and our critical interpretations
are perhaps more immediately relevant. When civil law conflicts with
religious conscience and the rhetorics of the state are at loggerheads
with the rhetorics of religion, rhe more unsavory, hard to navigate
undercurrents of civil religion are sometimes laid bare. The teeming
contradiccions, inconsistencies, and sometimes, downright unparallel
universes can be exposed like live wires whipping in a virulent
thunderstorm.
My own take on developing a useful method of accounring for
civil religious discourse is to investigate the ways and means the stare
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and/or its surrogates appropriate and employ religious symbols as a means
of pursuing particular interests. In turn, we also must address how
religious sects, groups, or individuals try to influence the state. Thus,
part of the task of exploring the rhetoric of civil religion in general is to
characterize and catalogue state-inspired-and-led references to God and
godly-values that imbue the state with transcendent appeal as well as
religious-inspired-and-led references to God and godly values that either
bless or challenge the political status quo. I believe these discursive
activities vitally affect our interpretations of civil religion in any particular
era and they have significant implications for church-state relations.
It is probably important to point our the obvious in this context.
Some strains of what Hart might label "unofficial" civil religion cake on
a decidedly liberal or conservative character in aim or goal, if not tone.
Certainly the civil religious discourse of Marrin Luther King, Jr. and
Jesse Jackson, for example, differs markedly in its goals than that of the
Reverend Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. The Southern Christian
Leadership Conference is not the Christian Coalition. Having pointed
out the obvious, it does seem to me a potentially useful scholarly
enterprise to examine the inherent similarities and differences that might
append here. At a minimum, detecting and accounting for the differences
between the prophetic and priestly voices reverberating in these liberal
and conservative strands of discourse may contribute to a further
understanding of the phenomenon discussed in these pages. In addition,
rhetorics of"rights" and "virtues" both potentially contribute to "national
moral character" and thus are both are worthy of funher investigation.
Moreover, whether the unofficial strain is "liberal" or "conservative,"
the discourse and the actions of the interlocutors involved may at times
impel the state into coercive action. That is, when pressed, the state has
few qualms about suppressing religion when necessary. As Thomas
Jefferson remarked, "it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil
government for its officers to interfere when principles break out inro overt
acts against peace and good order" (qtd. in McConnell, 2000, p. 96).
Reference to the coercive power of the state occasions another
vexing thought. It seems that not all forms of "official" civil religion
promote benign republican virtues, nor do all "serve the people." Some
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have proposed that this is also true of civil religious discourse in the
United States. Even those who firmly believe that civil religion is a
harmless piece of manipulative stitchery that helps attach delicate parches
to the intricate mosaic of rhe national quilt must admit that there is no
inviolate guarantee that chis will always be the case. What seems beyond
dispute is that civil religious discourse can be employed by the state to
mask and sometimes advance raw power. Rather than being "amicably
divorced" from political society, civil religion might be integral co
advancing the aims of repressive regimes. Marcela Crisci {200 1) cites
such cases in Spain, Malaysia, Chile, and China (see, e.g., Crisci &
Dawson, 1996; Regan, 1976; Stevens, 1975; Zuo, 1991) .

Republicanism and Liberalism
Susan Okin (1997), in a review of Michael Sandel's (1996)
Democracy's Discontent, notes that in America, historians have bemoaned
the eclipse of community by inclividualism at least since 1650. Okin
argues that Sandel approaches the latter part of the 20th century as
demonstration of the failure of individualism. More precisely, Sandel
contrasts republicans with liberals. Sandel valorizes republicans, who
through the practice of civic virtue, come to understand the importance
of self-government as a means ofserving the common good. Republicans
rhus are portrayed as focused on character and civic virtue. Republican
virtue comes from the distinct understanding that citizens are "obligated
to fulfill ends we have nor chosen" (Sandel, 1996, p. 12). This view
adumbrates the concept of rhe "encumbered" self, i.e., the creation and
implementation of a self char recognizes and enacts innate fundamental
duties to others.
For Sandel, liberals value and defend "free and independent
selves, unencumbered by moral or civic ties they have not chosen"
(Sandel, 1996, p. 6). Here individual rights are said to have precedence
over majority decisions. Okin asserts Sandel locates liberalism's "great
error" in its failure to engage rhe great moral issues in political life. If
Okin is correct (and I believe she stares rhe case well), Sandel's polarized,
manichaean account of"good" republicans and "bad" liberals, certainly
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can be related ro rhe discussion of civil religion. Ir matters very much if
"rights" discourse is actually trumping rhar of traditional "republican
virtues." How this plays out and what difference it will make in the 21st
century version of rhe American dream is, ro my mind, quire
consequential. Nevertheless, as Okin (1997) rightly observes, the fact
of the matter is "there have always been srrong liberal and republican
currents in U.S. political discourse ... and . . . these currents often coexist
in lhe beliefs of the same thinker" (p. 442). Okin (1997) poses the
foUowing question: "What civic virtues matter here and now?" Another
"rough question" is: Can "rhe independence required of republican
citizens ... co-exist with capitalism on any scale at all[?]" (p. 442). One
might also add that increasing globalization will impact the concept
and the conduct of nationhood. The unique forms of civil religion in
rhe United Stares and those of other nations in the international
community need ro be monitored, analyzed, and evaluated, especially
for major changes in both the strength and contour of civil religious
discourse. Transnational developments in civil religious discourse may
affect the U.S. of the future.

A Note on the Future
The future, of course, is filled with new challenges. In the
aftermath of September 11, Americans are discovering that rhe traditional
three-faith system (Protestant-Catholic-Jew) identified by Will Herberg
(1955) may have ro be revised. The traditions of Islam have become
imponanr, nor just because Americans are newly curious after having
experienced immense tragedy, but also because there is now a significant
portion ofAmerican citizens who identify with and practice Islam. There
are now over 7 million Muslims in the United States. Many experts
believe that the increasing Muslim numbers are eclipsing that of the
U. S. Jewish population. In the process of opening up lO the changed
religio-cultural terrain and in response ro the terrible events of September
11, Americans from the comfortable traditions of the three-faith system
have also had ro confront their own limited understanding of the religious
tenets and cultural practices ofAmerican citizens who are simultaneously
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practicing Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs. While a religion
like Islam may be able to comfortably engage "official" forms of civic
piety, it is unclear how well it can or will live with "unofficial" sources of
civil religious discourse, especially the more virulent strains. In any event,
the increasing presence of differing religious confessions is likely to affect,
if nor alter, certain interpretations and audience reactions- and,
therefore, has the potential to alter rherorical pronouncements. How
this rakes place and how we as a nation reinterpret civil religious discourse
in the face of these changes, of course, remains an open question.

Pluoralism and Seettlarism
One likely place where changes in religious lexicons might be
detected is in the dispute over the integrative and legitimation functions
of American civil religious discourse as handed down by tradition. Two
very large trends could rend ro further mitigate or vitiate those functions:
the increased internal religious and cultural pluralism alluded to above
and increased secularism. While Americans are overwhelmingly religious,
they are also increasingly wooed by the secular culture and irs material
enticements. Brief examples will have to suffice in this context. Increasing
pluralism, on irs face, can be viewed as a force in mitigating the purported
integra rive and legirmarion functions of civil religion. k Crisci (200 1)
points our, the "positive" attributes ofAmerican civil religion, including
irs alleged role in "nation-bu ilding, moral order, national identity and
solidarity, and irs purported function in building and sustaining
community have yet to be empirically verified" (p. 70). Perhaps, Cristi
theorizes, civil religion plays such a role with elites, bur rhe jury is still
out on how powerful and effective civil religious discourse is with
marginalized peoples both in the United Stares and elsewhere. Peoples
of color and those in underresourced communities may have very
different interpretations of civil religious discourse. Rheroricians need
to cake notice of and document such differences. One thinks of the
patriotic runes "My Country Tis ofThee" and "God Bless America" as
ultimate expressions of civil religion . Yet those songs have not produced
totalizing identifications. In America, we still have the ongoing
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phenomenon of the African American "national anthem," the perennial
song sung at many Martin Luther King, Jr. Day celebrations across this
nation, "Lift Every Voice."
Acceptance of civil religious discourse as a viable American
discursive practice seems to require a faith that people find assurance in
appeals to the sacred in promotion of the secular. In giving ourselves
over to the rhetoric of civic piety, for example, we are somehow involved
in both condoning and promoting a community of values important to
a democratic state, important, in particular, to a uniquely American
vision and set of values- liberty, freedom, equality, justice, and fair
play. As previously discussed , it is assumed that religion-inspired virtues
can sustain democratic republics. The values associated with civil religion,
however, compete with other important value clusters and they often
compete internally as well. Indeed, secular values have played a key role
in competing against, if not diminishing republican virtues. As Richard
Fenn (1972) has made clear, consensus in America may as easily be
forged on efficiency, rule of the experts, and the demands of the market
(Crisci, 2001, p. 75). While George W Bush has played a key role as
interpreter-in-chief of the new American civil religion of the 21st century,
that role was occasioned by the crisis of 9/11. As Crisci (200 1, p. 76)
observes, civil religion "may be something that varies with particular
historical or national circumstances. Consequently civil religious themes
would tend to emerge or become more visible in periods of national or
international crises." But even here Bush's "value message" was mixed.
One method Bush recommended for helping America "get back to
normal" was for each American to resume his or her role as a consumer
as an antidote to the damage done by September 11 and a flagging
economy. While his recent calls for self-sacrifice through a two-year
pledge of public service (utilizing the existing Peace Corp and Americorp)
are in line with republican virtues, the former call seemed geared toward
"individualism" and free enterprise. Thus, selfish motives seem destined
to compete with the selfless in the new world order of civil religion.
According co Ronald F. Theimann (2000), "The greatest
challenge facing American democracy today is to develop 'pluralist
citizens, ' people capable ofliving in a variety of different and sometimes
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conflicting worlds of meaning while stiU maimaining a robust sense of
personal and communal identil)'" (p. 83). How far presem and future
forms of civil religious discourse will go in helping Americans meet this
challenge remains an open question. h is a question, however, that
rhetoricians, following Rod Hart's legacy, stiU seem well-positioned ro
answer.
Suvm R. Goldzruig (Ph.D., Purdu~ Univ~rsity, 1985) is tt Proftssor ttt Mttrqum~
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Notes
1

Q uoced in Bellah ( 1992, p. 38).
Bellah's ( 1967) original a reide appeared in Da~d~lus. Afcer numerous artacks
on his discussion of civil religion, Bellah ( 1978) published a vigorous defense in
Soci~ty. This anide was reprimed in Bellah's (1992) Th~ Broken Covmant.
l [n rhis regard, I would like co publidy thank Rod llan for inspiring me: tu
investigate the more sectarian, panisan, and ideological forms of civil religious
discourse. Some cen years after his book appeared, I was able co idencify a rhetoric of
"public theology," which I argued was different from (and perhaps almost an inversion
of) what Hare would call "official" civic piecy (Goldzwig, 1987). I defined public
rheology as "theologically-based discourse intentionally targeced for mass audiences
in an accempt co inOuence the anirudes, beliefs, and values of both religious and
secular publics on public policy" (p. 130). Overtly partisan in scope, J argued char
public rheology revealed three disci nee rhetorical characteristics: expedient simplicicy,
exisrencial concenr, and action rituals. I encountered these rhetorical characteristics
in the "conservative" religious rhetoric of the Reverend Jerry Falwell and the "liberal"
religious rhetoric of Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador. This anicle would
have been impossible without Hare's pioneering work. Any mistakes in my 1987
piece are uniquely my own.
2
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